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JURISDICTION

The United States of America (“the Government” or “EPA”)
filed this enforcement action against Moon Moo Farm (“Moon
Moo”) for violating the permitting requirements of the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”). Deep Quod Riverwatcher and Dean James
(collectively “Riverwatcher”) joined these CWA claims and
asserted additional claims in the alternative under the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”). On June 1, 2014 the
district court, which had federal question jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. §1331, denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment and granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment
on all claims. A1, A12.1* This Court has jurisdiction to review the
district court’s final order. 28 U.S.C. §1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

I. Whether the Queechunk Canal, a navigable waterway
created through diversion of the Deep Quod River and commonly
used by the public, is subject to a public right of navigation.
II. Whether, if the Queechunk Canal is not a subject to a
public right of navigation, evidence obtained by a private party
through trespass is admissible in an EPA civil enforcement
proceeding brought to protect drinking water and ensure ongoing
CWA compliance.
III. Whether Moon Moo Farm is a Controlled Animal Feeding
Operation (“CAFO”) subject to National Pollutant Discharge
Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting under the CWA.
Alternatively, if Moon Moo is not considered a CAFO, whether
the farm is subject to NPDES permitting requirements.
1 Citations “A__” refer to pages of the Final Problem, Revised on November 18,
2014.
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IV. Whether under the statutory definition of “solid waste”
that applies to an endangerment claim—rather than the
regulatory definition which applies only to regulatory violations—
Riverwatcher has established that Moon Moo’s spreading
activities constitute an endangerment to health and the
environment. And, whether Moon Moo’s soil amendment is a
“solid waste” for regulatory purposes, and even if it were, whether
it is exempt from RCRA’s open dumping ban as agricultural
waste.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

EPA’s mission—both overall and as applied to this case—is to
safeguard human health and the environment. Under that
mission, EPA’s capacity to protect clean rivers and clean drinking
water fundamentally depends on its ability to bring enforcement
actions. Here, EPA brought such an action to halt and correct
violations that endanger not only the Queechunk Canal
(“Queechunk”) and the Deep Quod River (“Deep Quod”) but also
the Town of Farmville’s drinking water. Because Congress
understood the importance of enforcement in ensuring
compliance with CWA and RCRA standards, it created provisions
enabling private citizens to assist EPA with enforcement. The
citizen group Riverwatcher has fulfilled that role here.
EPA has adopted regulations that protect human health and
the environment while allowing farms and businesses like Moon
Moo to continue their operations as long as they comply with
these standards. EPA’s aim here is to ensure that Moon Moo
operates in a manner consistent with these standards, ensuring
protection of health and the environment.
The enforcement action EPA brought against Moon Moo is
based on evidence collected by Riverwatcher Dean James in a
publicly navigable waterway. That evidence shows water with
excessive levels of pollutants flowing into Queechunk, the Deep
Quod, and then downstream to Farmville. EPA brought this
action to remediate Moon Moo’s past violations and force its
compliance with the applicable statutory and regulatory
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standards now and in the future. Ensuring Moon Moo’s
compliance, in turn, will help protect the area’s waterways as
well as Farmville’s drinking water source, in accordance with
EPA’s mandate.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Located in the State of New Union, Moon Moo is a dairy farm
situated at a bend in the Deep Quod, which runs year round and
flows into the Mississippi River. A5. In the 1940s, the farm’s
previous owner excavated a 50-yard bypass canal that locals now
refer to as Queechunk. A5. Today, most of the flow of the Deep
Quod is diverted through this canal, and many community
members use it as a shortcut when traveling up and down the
river. A5.
The large quantities of liquid waste produced by Moon Moo’s
cows runs through a series of drains and pipes from the cow barn
into an outdoor lagoon, where the liquid waste is stored for use as
fertilizer. A5-6. In 2012, Moon Moo Farm began mixing acid whey
from the Chokos Greek yogurt processing facility into its liquid
manure. A6. When Moon Moo fertilizes its 150 acres of Bermuda
grass fields, the liquid solution from the lagoon is pumped into
tank trailers that spray it onto the land. A5. The liquid manure
flows through a drainage ditch from the fields into Queechunk,
and, from there, into the Deep Quod. Downstream of Moon Moo,
residents of the City of Farmville rely on the Deep Quod for
drinking water. A5.
In late winter and early spring of 2013, the Farmville Water
Authority issued a nitrate advisory for the city’s drinking water,
warning residents that high levels of nitrates in the Deep Quod
made its water hazardous if consumed by infants younger than
two years of age. A6. During the same time period, several local
residents alerted the Deep Quod Riverwatcher, a nonprofit
organization committed to protecting local waterways, that the
Deep Quod smelled of manure and was an unusually turbid
brown color. A6. In response to these complaints, Deep Quod
Riverwatcher Dean James patrolled the river in a small boat.
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While traveling along Queechunk, James observed and
photographed Moon Moo’s manure-spreading operations taking
place during a significant storm event. A6. James also observed
and photographed discolored brown water flowing from Moon
Moo’s fields through its drainage ditch and into Queechunk. A6.
Without entering Moon Moo’s property, James took samples of
the water flowing from the ditch, which he brought to a
laboratory for testing. The test results showed highly elevated
levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms. A6.
Knowledge of the spreading operations and resultant
elevated levels of nitrates and fecal coliforms drove Riverwatcher
to serve a letter of intent to sue. In response, EPA brought this
CWA enforcement action against Moon Moo for injunctive relief
under 33 U.S.C. §1319(b) and for civil penalties under 33 U.S.C.
§1319(d). Riverwatcher subsequently intervened as a plaintiff,
under 33 U.S.C. §1365(b)(1)(B), and alleged additional claims
under the citizen suit provisions of RCRA. 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1).
Following discovery, both sides moved for summary judgment.
The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motions for summary
judgment on their CWA and RCRA claims and granted
Defendant’s motions for summary judgment ruling in its favor on
all counts, including a trespass counterclaim against
Riverwatcher.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine
dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court of
Appeals applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s
grant of summary judgment and construes the evidence in the
light most favorable to the non-moving party. See, e.g., Pucino v.
Verizon Wireless Commc’ns, Inc., 618 F.3d 112, 117 (2d Cir. 2010).
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

First, Riverwatcher Dean James was not trespassing when
he collected the water sample on April 12, 2013, because the
public trust doctrine dictates that navigable-in-fact waterways
are subject to a public right of navigation. The navigable-in-fact
test includes waterways, like Queechunk, that are navigable only
after man-made improvements. This general rule is not altered
by more recent cases dealing with man-made waterways
designated as private under state law, and there is no indication
that New Union law designates Queechunk as private. Thus,
Queechunk is navigable in fact and is subject to a right of public
navigation as a matter of law, and summary judgment in favor of
EPA and Riverwatcher is appropriate.
Even if Queechunk were private under state law, the canal
would still be subject to a public right of navigation because
longstanding adverse use by the community has created a public
prescriptive easement in the canal. Queechunk is also subject to a
public right of use because it was originally created through the
diversion of a natural navigable-in-fact waterway. Thus, if this
Court finds that Queechunk is not a public navigable-in-fact
waterway as a matter of law, it should remand for further
findings on the question of whether a right of public use has been
created through one of these two alternative means.
Second, if this Court were to find that James’s visit to
Queechunk constituted trespass, the evidence James collected is
still admissible in EPA’s civil enforcement proceeding against
Moon Moo. Most importantly, the exclusionary rule does not
apply in EPA civil enforcement proceedings because the public
benefit of preventing further drinking water pollution far
outweighs the small possibility of deterring Fourth Amendment
violations. Moreover, EPA enforcement actions are prospective
and remedial—not punitive—unlike criminal cases in which the
rule generally applies. Lastly, even in the rare civil proceedings
where it might apply, the exclusionary rule does not apply to
evidence collected by private parties like James.
Third, Moon Moo meets all of the regulatory requirements for
CAFOs. Importantly, Moon Moo qualifies as a CAFO because a
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man-made drainage ditch conveys liquid fertilizer from the fields
of Bermuda grass into Queechunk. The fertilizer sprayed on the
fields that flowed into Queechunk is not agricultural stormwater
pollution. EPA regulations and court precedent dictate that
discharges from CAFOs are agricultural stormwater discharges
only when farms adhere to satisfactory Nutrient Management
Plans (“NMPs”). Moon Moo’s practices, which are allegedly
consistent with its NMP, were clearly the result of an
inappropriate plan. The Court should hold that as a CAFO, the
farm has a duty to apply for a NPDES permit. If, however, the
Court finds insufficient evidence that the drainage ditch was a
conveyance and therefore determines that Moon Moo is not a
CAFO, the Court should find that Moon Moo does not have a duty
to apply for a NPDES permit because it is a nonpoint source. In
either circumstance, Plaintiffs-Appellants are entitled to
summary judgment as a matter of law on their CWA claims.
Fourth, though EPA did not join Riverwatcher’s RCRA
claims, the district court mistakenly applied the same regulatory
definition of “solid waste” in its rejection of both the
endangerment and open dumping claims. For the endangerment
claim it should instead have applied the broader statutory
definition, which the soil application meets. Accordingly, the
district court erred in dismissing that claim and this Court
should grant summary judgment for Riverwatcher or, if it deems
that the record is inadequate for the fact-intensive endangerment
inquiry, this Court should remand for additional fact-finding.
However, the district court correctly determined, and this Court
should affirm, that according to the regulatory definition of “solid
waste,” Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping ban.
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ARGUMENT

I.

JAMES DID NOT TRESPASS ON MOON MOO’S
PROPERTY BECAUSE QUEECHUNK CANAL IS
SUBJECT TO A PUBLIC RIGHT OF NAVIGATION.

James’s visit to Queechunk did not constitute trespass
because Queechunk is subject to a public right of navigation. The
public right of navigation, also sometimes described as a right of
public use, at a minimum includes public use for “navigation and
commerce.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 457 (1892).
The right of public navigation can arise from a variety of sources;
in Queechunk it flows from the public trust doctrine, a public
easement, and the fact that Queechunk was established by
replacement of a navigable waterway.
A. Queechunk Canal is Subject to a Public Right of
Navigation Because it is a Public Trust Navigable
Waterway
Under the public trust doctrine, navigable waterways are
“held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters.” Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. at 452.2
While “the public trust doctrine remains a matter of state law,”
PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215, 1235 (2012), the
state’s control over navigable waters is “subject . . . to the
paramount power of the United States to control such waters for
purposes of navigation,” id. at 1228 (internal quotation marks
omitted). The Supreme Court has called this federal navigation
servitude “a superior navigation easement.” United States v.
Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 225 (1956). Thus, under
public trust doctrine and the related federal navigation servitude,
navigable waterways are subject to a public right of navigation.

2. In the United States, the public trust doctrine applies to navigable waters
that are nontidal as well as tidal. PPL Mont., LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215,
1226-27 (2012).
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The definition of what constitutes a navigable waterway, and
is thus subject to the public trust doctrine and the federal
navigation servitude, has been recognized for more than a
century: “Those rivers must be regarded as public navigable
rivers in law which are navigable in fact.” The Daniel Ball, 77
U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870). The Supreme Court’s four-part
test originally held that waterways are navigable in fact if they
are:
used, or are susceptible of being used, [1] in their ordinary
condition, [2] as highways for commerce, over which trade and
travel are or may be conducted [3] in the customary modes of
trade and travel on water . . . [4] when they form . . . by
themselves, or by uniting with other waters, a continued highway
over which commerce is or may be carried on.

Id. The Supreme Court later eliminated the “ordinary condition”
requirement, recognizing that “[t]o appraise the evidence of
navigability on the natural condition only of the waterway is
erroneous.” United States v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311
U.S. 377, 407 (1940).3 Except for the elimination of this
requirement, the basic navigable-in-fact test remains unchanged
today. See PPL Mont., 132 S. Ct. at 1228 (citing The Daniel Ball’s
navigable-in-fact test but noting that the ordinary condition
requirement does not apply in all situations).
Queechunk meets these requirements for the modern
navigable-in-fact test. First, Queechunk is “commonly used” for
travel, A5, thereby satisfying the “trade or travel” prong. Second,
the “customary modes” prong has been interpreted to mean that a
waterway must be capable of navigation by a small boat or canoe.
See, e.g., FPL Energy Maine Hydro LLC v. FERC, 287 F.3d 1151,
1157 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Queechunk meets this prong of the test too,
as James was able to navigate the canal in his jon boat, A6, which
is comparable in size to a canoe, see United States v. Sasser, 738
3. While the case eliminating this requirement dealt with the scope of
Congress’s authority over a waterway, it should be interpreted to apply to the
navigable-in-fact test generally, as it was decided before the Supreme Court
created the split between Congress’s regulatory power and the right of public
use. See Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 177-78 (1979); see also id.
at 185 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining that, until this case, no case had
ever “call[ed] certain waters ‘navigable’ for some purposes, but ‘non-navigable’
for purposes of the navigational servitude”).
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F. Supp. 177, 178 (D.S.C. 1990) (describing the size of a jon boat).
Finally, Queechunk originates from and flows back into the Deep
Quod, which “runs into the Mississippi River, . . . a navigable-infact interstate body of water that has long been used for
commercial navigation.” A5. Thus, Queechunk meets the
“highway [for] commerce” prong, the final prong of the navigablein-fact test. Queechunk is therefore navigable in fact and must be
“regarded as [a] public navigable river[] in law.” The Daniel Ball,
77 U.S. at 563.
The right of public navigation attaching to Queechunk is
unchanged by cases holding that there may not be a public right
of use in a man-made body of water that is considered private
under state law. In Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164
(1979), the Supreme Court held that “a body of water that was
private property under Hawaiian law” was not subject to a public
right of access simply by being “linked to navigable water by a
channel dredged by [the owners of the pond],” id. at 179-80.
Circuit courts applying Kaiser Aetna have consistently read it
to mean that there is no public right of navigation where a manmade body of water is designated as private under state law. For
example, the Ninth Circuit noted that “[t]he [Supreme] Court
placed significant weight on the treatment of Kuapa Pond as
private property and the reasonable investment-backed
expectations of the Pond’s owners.” Boone v. United States, 944
F.2d 1489, 1502 (9th Cir. 1991) (discussing Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 166-67). In applying the Kaiser Aetna doctrine to a case
factually similar to Kaiser Aetna, therefore, the Ninth Circuit
found that the water body in question was not subject to a right of
public access because it was not navigable in its natural state and
because “under Hawaiian law . . . [its] private nature [was]
beyond dispute.” Boone, 944 F.2d at 1502. Similarly, where the
Fifth Circuit held that a privately dredged canal was not subject
to a public right of use, it reached this conclusion only after
finding that “the record clearly reflects that all of the remaining
waterways at issue are privately owned” under state law. Dardar
v. Lafourche Realty Co., 55 F.3d 1082, 1086 (5th Cir. 1995).
Contrary to these circuit court interpretations, the district
court here wrongly read Kaiser Aetna to stand for the blanket
proposition that “there is no public right of navigation in a manmade water body.” A9. In fact, Kaiser Aetna only applies to the
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relatively narrow set of cases in which a man-made body of water
is explicitly found to be private under state law. In the absence of
such a finding, Kaiser Aetna leaves intact the existing framework
holding that a waterway that is navigable in fact is subject to a
public right of navigation. Here, there is no suggestion that
Queechunk—a waterway fed directly from and flowing back into
a publicly navigable river—is inherently private under state law.4
Indeed, the district court found that New Union has not
developed any state law on the scope of navigation rights or the
public trust doctrine as they apply to man-made or natural
waterways.5 A9. Thus, Kaiser Aetna does not alter the conclusion
that, as a navigable-in-fact waterway, Queechunk is subject to a
public right of navigation.
There is no dispute of material facts as to the physical status
of Queechunk: Queechunk’s physical attributes satisfy the
modern test for a navigable-in-fact waterway, and Queechunk is
thus subject to a right of public navigation. Therefore, this Court
should deny Defendant’s motion and should grant summary
judgment for Riverwatcher on the trespass counterclaim.
B. Even if Queechunk Canal Were Not a Public Trust
Waterway, it is Still Subject to a Public Right Of
Navigation
Even if a water body is private under state law, a public right
of navigation may be created through other means. Queechunk is
subject to a public right of navigation both because public use has
created a prescriptive easement, and because the canal was
created through the diversion of a naturally navigable waterway,
allowing the canal to substitute for that waterway.

4. Though Moon Moo owns the land on the sides and bottom of the canal,
A2, streambed ownership has no bearing on the public trust doctrine or on
federal powers over the water flowing through the stream, PPL Montana, 132 S.
Ct. at 1234-35.
5. In fact, some states apply an even more lenient test than the federal test
for determining which waters are public. See, e.g., Tex. River Barges v. City of
San Antonio, 21 S.W.3d 347, 352 (Tex. App. 2000) (holding that the statutory
definition “render[s] all streams navigable in law that have an average width of
30 feet, regardless of ownership of the bed . . . and regardless of whether they
are actually navigable”).
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Longstanding, Continuous, Adverse Use has
Created a Public Prescriptive Easement in
Queechunk

Prescriptive public easements can create a public right-ofway in a formerly private property. While the modern
requirements for a prescriptive easement vary slightly by state,
most states require that public use be (1) open and notorious
(meaning visible and known to the owner), (2) adverse to the
owner, and (3) continuous and uninterrupted for a period
typically ranging from ten to twenty years. See, e.g., Fogerty v.
State, 187 Cal. App. 3d 224, 238 (Ct. App. 1986); Graham v.
Mack, 699 P.2d 590, 595 (Mont. 1984); see also 2 Am. Jur. Proof of
Facts 3d 197, § 2 (1988) (cataloguing requirements under state
property law). States that have considered easements in private
waterways have found that the doctrine of prescriptive easement,
which typically pertains to land, “appl[ies] by analogy to rights-ofway over non-navigable streams.” Buffalo River Conservation &
Recreation Council v. Nat’l Park Serv., 558 F.2d 1342, 1345 (8th
Cir. 1977); see also State ex rel. Meek v. Hays, 785 P.2d 1356, 1363
(Kan. 1990).
Queechunk meets these standard requirements for a
prescriptive public easement. First, “the Canal is commonly used
as a shortcut.” A5. Because Queechunk is widely used by the
public, it is likely that this frequent use is also widely known.
Second, it is clear that public use is adverse to the owner, as
Moon Moo has posted “No Trespassing” signs along the canal
rather than inviting the public to use it freely. A5. Finally, the
ongoing and “common” use of the canal, A5, provides no
indication that the public usage has been interrupted or
inconsistent. Rather, it appears likely that the canal has been
publicly used since its creation in the 1940s, A5, thus easily
satisfying the requirement of continuous use for ten to twenty
years.
Thus, the facts on the record suggest that the public has
acquired a prescriptive easement in Queechunk, and this Court
should find a public right of use in the canal. At the very least,
the record raises a dispute of material fact about the existence of
such an easement, in which case this Court should remand the
question to the district court for further findings of fact.
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2.

Queechunk Canal was Created Through the
Diversion of a Navigable Waterway, Giving the
Public a Right of Navigation

Even in the absence of a prescriptive easement, an artificial
navigable waterway that would otherwise be considered private
may nonetheless be subject to a public right of navigation if it
was created “in part by means of diversion or destruction of a preexisting natural navigable waterway.” Vaughn v. Vermilion Corp.
(Vaughn I), 444 U.S. 206, 208 (1979). In Vaughn I, the companion
case to Kaiser Aetna, the Supreme Court created this exception to
the Kaiser Aetna rule for instances where a “system of artificial
waterways was substituted for the pre-existing natural system of
navigable waterways.” Id. at 209. As the Louisiana Supreme
Court explained in later proceedings in that case, “The [U.S.]
Supreme Court’s opinion indicates that defendants would have a
right under federal law to use [manmade] canals as a substitute
for any natural, navigable waterway substantially impaired or
destroyed by construction of the artificial system.” Vermilion
Corp. v. Vaughn (Vaughn II), 397 So. 2d 490, 492 (La. 1981).
There is strong evidence that this exception applies to
Queechunk. First, Queechunk was “excavated [as] a bypass canal
in the Deep Quod,” A5, so Queechunk was clearly created “by
means of diversion . . . of a pre-existing natural navigable
waterway,” Vaughn I, 444 U.S. at 208. Moreover, “[m]ost of the
flow of the Deep Quod River is diverted into the Queechunk
Canal,” A5, indicating that the Deep Quod was “substantially
impaired” by the construction of Queechunk, Vaughn II, 397 So.
2d at 492. Thus, the facts on the record indicate that Queechunk
serves as “a substitute for [a] natural, navigable waterway,” id.,
and accordingly, this Court should find a public right of
navigation in the canal. At a minimum, the record creates a
question of material fact regarding the extent to which
Queechunk serves as a substitute for the Deep Quod, and the
Court should remand for further findings of fact on this issue.
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II. THE EVIDENCE COLLECTED BY JAMES IS
ADMISSIBLE IN THE CIVIL ENFORCEMENT
PROCEEDING INITIATED BY EPA
The exclusionary rule, where it applies, excludes evidence
collected illegally or without a warrant. “[T]he rule’s prime
purpose is to deter future unlawful police conduct and thereby
effectuate the guarantee of the Fourth Amendment.” United
States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). Thus, the rule
typically applies only in criminal cases: “‘[i]n the complex and
turbulent history of the rule, the [Supreme] Court never has
applied it to exclude evidence from a civil proceeding, federal or
state.’” INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1984)
(quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 447 (1976)).6 There
is no reason for this Court to diverge from Supreme Court
precedent and extend the exclusionary rule to this civil
proceeding.
A.

The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply in EPA
Civil Enforcement Proceedings

The exclusionary rule does not apply in EPA enforcement
actions because the costs and benefits of applying the rule weigh
strongly against applying it in proceedings to protect public
health and the environment, see Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at
1041, and the proceedings aim at prospective relief rather than
punishment, id. at 1046.
1.

The Minimal Benefit of Applying the
Exclusionary Rule Does Not Justify the High
Cost of Excluding Valuable Evidence in EPA
Enforcement Proceedings

In deciding whether to apply the exclusionary rule in a noncriminal context, the Supreme Court applies a balancing test
that:

6. The Supreme Court has not addressed this issue since Lopez-Mendoza in
1984, so it remains true that the Court has never applied the rule to exclude
evidence in a civil proceeding.
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weigh[s] the likely social benefits of excluding unlawfully
obtained evidence against the likely costs. On the benefit side of
the balance the prime purpose of the exclusionary rule . . . is to
deter future unlawful police conduct. On the cost side there is the
loss of often probative evidence and . . . secondary costs that flow
from the less accurate or more cumbersome adjudication that
therefore occurs.

Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1041 (internal citations omitted). In
the only two cases where the Supreme Court analyzed whether
the exclusionary rule should apply in civil proceedings, it decided
the cost of applying the rule outweighed the possible deterrence
benefits, and thus declined to apply the rule. Lopez-Mendoza, 468
U.S. at 1050; Janis, 428 U.S. at 454.
In the instant case, applying the exclusionary rule would
mean excluding evidence that shows Moon Moo has polluted a
waterway that Farmville relies on for drinking water. Such an
outcome would deprive EPA of the ability to bring a civil
enforcement proceeding to protect Farmville’s drinking water and
ensure Moon Moo’s ongoing CWA compliance. The social costs of
applying the exclusionary rule in this case are therefore very
high. On the other side of the scale, the possible deterrence
benefit of applying the exclusionary rule is likely low. As
discussed further below, a private citizen is unlikely to be
deterred from collecting evidence by a rule designed to deter
unlawful government conduct. The low deterrence benefit here is
outweighed by the high social costs at stake; thus the Supreme
Court’s balancing test dictates that the exclusionary rule must
not be extended to apply to EPA civil enforcement proceedings.
2.

The Primary Purpose of the Proceeding is
Prospective Relief, Not Punishment

Furthermore, the Supreme Court has recognized that the
cost of applying the exclusionary rule in proceedings intended to
prevent ongoing violations—where courts would be “closing their
eyes to ongoing violations of the law”—is so great as to be
unacceptable. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. at 1046. Presenting a
hypothetical example strikingly similar to the case at bar, the
Court stated:
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Presumably no one would argue that the exclusionary rule
should be invoked to prevent an agency from ordering corrective
action at a leaking hazardous waste dump if the evidence
underlying the order had been improperly obtained . . . . On the
rare occasions that it has considered costs of this type the Court
has firmly indicated that the exclusionary rule does not extend
this far.

Id. Interpreting that case, some circuit courts have focused on
whether the relief sought is prospective or punitive in nature.
E.g., Trinity Indus., Inc. v. OSHRC, 16 F.3d 1455, 1461-62 (6th
Cir. 1994); Smith Steel Casting Co. v. Brock, 800 F.2d 1329 (5th
Cir. 1986); Garrett v. Lehman, 751 F.2d 997, 1002 (9th Cir. 1985).
In all of these cases, the court found that the exclusionary rule
does not apply when the relief sought is prospective, but it may
apply when the relief sought is punitive, as punitive sanctions
tend to be more analogous to the criminal context. Compare
Garrett, 751 F.2d at 1002 (exclusionary rule did not apply in
military discharge hearings because they were prospective), with
Trinity Indus., 16 F.3d at 1462 (exclusionary rule may apply in
OSHA proceeding seeking punitive monetary penalties).
EPA’s enforcement action against Moon Moo seeks to halt
current CWA violations and prospectively ensure Moon Moo’s
ongoing and future compliance with the CWA.7 Analogizing from
the hazardous waste violation hypothesized in Lopez-Mendoza, an
injunction to stop CWA violations is clearly a form of prospective
relief. Thus, the exclusionary rule does not apply to James’s
evidence for purposes of the injunctive relief sought under 33
U.S.C. §1319(b).8
Nor does the exclusionary rule apply to the civil penalties
sought under 33 U.S.C. §1319(d), because “monetary penalties
7. Riverwatcher’s RCRA claims are also grounded in this evidence. The
Government has found no case law to suggest that the exclusionary rule would
apply differently to those claims.
8. Contrary to the district court’s broad statements, A9, this conclusion is
not questioned by any of the cases analyzing the exclusionary rule in the civil
context. Indeed, even courts that used the exclusionary rule to bar evidence in
OSHA actions for civil penalties nonetheless reiterated that “we do not believe
that the exclusionary rule should be invoked to prevent the Secretary of Labor
from ordering correction of OSHA violations . . . , even though the evidence . . .
was improperly obtained.” Smith Steel Casting, 800 F.2d at 1334 (emphasis in
original).
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[have not] historically been viewed as punishment.” Hudson v.
United States, 522 U.S. 93, 104 (1997). Rather, monetary
penalties are civil as long as they are not “so punitive in form and
effect as to render them criminal despite Congress’ intent.” Id.
Here, the primary purpose of the civil penalties sought by EPA is
not to punish but rather to help EPA recover its costs of
enforcement (thus ensuring future compliance), to fund
remediation for past damages, and to deter future violations. The
Supreme Court has specifically explained that a civil penalty
“may be remedial in character if it merely reimburses the
government for its actual costs arising from the defendant’s . . .
conduct.” Dep’t of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767,
777 (1994). Under this standard, as well as under the broader
rule interpreting monetary penalties as civil, the exclusionary
rule is inapplicable to EPA’s action for civil penalties, which is
remedial rather than punitive.
B. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Apply to James’
Evidence, Because the Evidence Was Collected by
a Private Party
Even if the exclusionary rule applied in EPA enforcement
proceedings, “[i]t is well established . . . that the exclusionary
rule, as a deterrent sanction, is not applicable where a private
party . . . commits the offending act,” United States v. Janis, 428
U.S. 433, 455 n.31 (1976). This is because the rule would not
“have a sufficient likelihood of deterring the conduct” of a private
party (or a sovereign other than the one prosecuting the case). Id.
at 454.
The Supreme Court has created a narrow exception
recognizing that “where a private party acts as an ‘instrument or
agent’ of the state in effecting a search or seizure, fourth
amendment interests are implicated” and the exclusionary rule
may apply. United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 791 (9th Cir.
1981) (citing Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487
(1971)). The two primary factors for determining whether a
private party acted as an instrument or agent of the state are:
“(1) the government’s knowledge and acquiescence, and (2) the
intent of the party performing the search.” Walther, 652 F.2d at
792. “If both factors are present, a private party will be
considered to have acted as a government agent.” United States v.
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Harrison, 168 F.3d 483, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 910, at *2 (4th
Cir. Jan. 25, 1999). If either factor is not satisfied, the private
party acted independently and the evidence is admissible.
James clearly acted independently in collecting the water
sample from Queechunk Canal. The record strongly suggests that
James was alone when he visited Queechunk and collected the
sample, thus no EPA officers were present. A6. And no party has
suggested that EPA had any knowledge of or influence on James’s
decision to collect the sample. Instead, because he acted without
the government’s “knowledge or acquiescence,” Walther, 652 F.2d
at 792, James cannot be considered an “instrument or agent” of
the government for purposes of the exclusionary rule. Because the
exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence collected by private
parties except under the narrow “instrument or agent” carve-out,
id., the water-quality evidence James collected is admissible in
this civil enforcement proceeding.
III. MOON MOO IS A CAFO SUBJECT TO NPDES
PERMITTING REQUIREMENTS UNDER THE
CWA
Congress enacted the CWA with the ultimate goal of
“eliminat[ing] the discharge of pollutants into the navigable
waters.” 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251(a)(6), (a)(1). It proscribes the
“discharge of pollutants” from “point sources,” which are defined
as “any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a); 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14). To further this goal, the EPA
created the CAFO classification to designate as point sources
operations that congregate animals and concentrate manure and
other waste. Moon Moo’s discharges meet all of EPA’s criteria for
CAFO classification and, because the discharge was not caused by
rain, its discharges are subject to NPDES permitting
requirements.
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A. Moon Moo Qualifies as a CAFO and Should be
Subject to NPDES Permitting Because it
Discharges Manure From its Land Application
Area
1.

Moon Moo Fulfills All of the Regulatory
Requirements for a CAFO

As the district court opinion states, Moon Moo fits squarely
into the regulatory definition of a CAFO. A8; 40 C.F.R. §122.23.
Moon Moo firstly qualifies as an animal feeding operation
(“AFO”) because the facility confines milk cows throughout the
year. The regulation states:
Animal feeding operation . . . means a lot or facility . . . where the
following conditions are met: (i) Animals . . . have been, are, or
will be stabled or confined and fed or maintained for a total of 45
days or more in any 12-month period, and (ii) Crops, vegetation,
forage growth, or post-harvest residues are not sustained in the
normal growing season over any portion of the lot or facility.

40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(1). Moon Moo’s practice of confining cows all
year without pasturing them clearly fits the first prong of the
AFO test. A4. The farm’s 150 acres of fields do not violate the
test’s second prong because the Bermuda grass is not grown
within the animal confinement area. See 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(3)
(defining “land application area”); Concerned Area Residents for
the Env’t v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 1994)
(“[t]he [CAFO] vegetation criterion applies to the lot or facility in
which the animals are confined”); Office of Wastewater Mgmt.,
NPDES Permit Writers’ Manual for Concentrated Animal Feeding
Operations, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency 2-3, (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter
NPDES Manual] (stating that the second AFO prong “relates to
the portion of the facility where animals are confined”).
In order to qualify as a CAFO, an AFO must meet two
additional requirements: first, it must house between 200 and
699 mature dairy cows, whether milked or dry, 40 C.F.R.
122.23(b)(6)(i)(A); and second, it must meet one of the following
conditions: “(A) Pollutants are discharged into waters of the
United States through a man-made ditch . . . or other similar
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man-made device; or (B) Pollutants are discharged directly into
waters of the United States . . . .”
40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(ii).9 For the last two years, Moon Moo has
housed 350 dairy cows, well within the range of 200 to 699
mature dairy cows necessary for qualification as a Medium
CAFO. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(i)(A). The farm also directly fulfills
the discharge requirements as defined under part (A). 40 C.F.R.
§122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). The drainage ditch acts to funnel liquid waste
sprayed onto the fields into Queechunk. The ditch’s role as a
conveyance for pollutants qualifies the Farm as a CAFO because
(1) the liquid fertilizer mixture sprayed on the grass is a pollutant
under the CWA, (2) the body of water into which the pollutants
are drained is a water of the United States, and (3) the man-made
drainage ditch was the mechanism through which the pollutants
applied onto the land were conveyed into the waters.
First, the manure-whey mixture Moon Moo applied to the
farm’s land application area is a pollutant. The CWA defines
“pollutant” as “agricultural waste discharged into water,” 33
U.S.C. § 1362(6), and “discharge of a pollutant” as “any addition
of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source,” 33
U.S.C. 1362(12)(A). The flow of the fertilizer solution from Moon
Moo’s fields, through the drainage ditch and into Queechunk is
properly considered the discharge of a pollutant because the
solution, a pollutant, originated from a CAFO, which is, by
statutory definition, a point source. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(a) (CAFOs
“are point sources, subject to NPDES permitting requirements as
provided in this section”).
Second, it is undisputed that Queechunk runs directly into
the Deep Quod, which runs year-round and flows into the
Mississippi River, a navigable interstate waterway. A5.
Provisions prohibiting the discharge of pollutants into waters of
the United States extend to water bodies that do not flow across
state borders if they are part of a larger system connecting them
to a navigable river. Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 717
(2006) (“[A] water or wetland constitutes ‘navigable waters’ under
the [CWA] if it possesses a ‘significant nexus’ to waters that are
navigable in fact or that could reasonably be so made.”); N. River
9. These requirements apply to Medium CAFOs. Different criteria and
responsibilities apply to Small and Large CAFOs. 40 C.F.R. §§ 122.23(b)(4);
(b)(9).
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Watch v. City of Healdsburg, 496 F.3d 993, 1000 (9th Cir. 2007)
(finding a water-filled quarry is a “navigable water” under the
CWA because it is “part of a larger wetland that is ‘adjacent’ to
the River” and there exists a “substantial nexus” as required by
Rapanos).10 Most of the Deep Quod’s water is diverted through
Queechunk, and Queechunk flows directly back into the Deep
Quod. A5. Thus, there is clearly a sufficient nexus between
Queechunk, the Deep Quod, and the Mississippi to consider the
canal a water of the United States.
Third, the drainage ditch played an important role in
conveying the fertilizer solution into the canal. The district court
described the undisputed fact that “discolored brown water
flow[ed] from the fields through a drainage ditch into the
Queechunk Canal.” A6. The drainage ditch’s role in the
architecture of the farm—to drain excess manure flowing from
the fields—comfortably meets the common law definition of a
discharge: to “add pollutants from the outside world to navigable
water.” Comm. to Save Mokelumne River v. East Bay Mun. Util.
Dist., 13 F.3d 305, 308 (9th Cir. 1993) (quoting Nat’l Wildlife
Fed’n v. Consumers Power Co., 862 F.2d 580, 584 (6th Cir. 1988))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
Moon Moo may argue that the drainage ditch was created to
convey stormwater from the farm’s property into Queechunk,
rather than conveying pollutants into U.S. waters. However, as
EPA has indicated in guidance documents, a conveyance that
transports waste is considered to serve this purpose whether it
was intended for that purpose or not. NPDES Manual, at 2-9
(noting that “[a] man-made channel or ditch that was not created
specifically to carry animal wastes but nonetheless does so is
considered a man-made device” for the purposes of the statute’s
requirement that pollutants are discharged into the waters
through a man-made ditch or other man-made device). Because
Moon Moo meets all of the requirements for an AFO and a CAFO,
the farm is a CAFO under the CWA. Moon Moo’s qualification as
a CAFO makes it a point source. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(a).
10. Because it flows from the interpretation of specific statutory language,
the definition of “waters of the United States” under the CWA does not affect the
analysis of navigable waters discussed in Part I. Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 723-24
(discussing the divergence of the common law and statutory definitions of
“navigable waters of the United States”).
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Precedent Dictates that Moon Moo is a CAFO

No binding case law, to the Government’s knowledge,
disputes the finding that Moon Moo’s discharges come from a
point source due to the farm’s classification as a CAFO. The lower
court’s reliance on Alt v. EPA, 979 F. Supp. 2d 701 (N.D.W. Va.
2013), to assert that the discharge in the instant case is
agricultural stormwater runoff, and not a CAFO discharge,
represents a misapplication of that relatively narrow holding to
the instant case. While Alt, a Northern District of West Virginia
case, indicates that some CAFO discharges are considered
agricultural stormwater discharges despite CAFOs’ status as
point sources, id. at 715, the facts of Alt are materially different
from those of the instant case. In Alt, dry particles of manure and
litter from the farm’s eight poultry confinement houses were
tracked and spilled in the farmyard surrounding the CAFO.
Additionally, the ventilation systems in the enclosed houses blew
“some dust composed of manure, litter and dander, and some
feathers” onto the farmyard, where the pollutants “settled on the
ground.” Id. at 704. In Alt, rainfall was required in this case to
move the dry dust particles from the farmyard into the nearby
waterway. Id. (stating that precipitation “contacted the particles”
and “carried” them into a water of the United States). That
situation is substantially different from the instant case, where
liquid manure sprayed onto the fields flowed directly into the
canal. A6.
The Alt court indicated the steps that Lois Alt used to
prevent manure and litter from exposure to precipitation. Among
these was “[e]xercise of reasonable care in cleaning up manure or
litter that might spill during transfer operations” Alt, 979 F. Supp
2d at 705. This level of care differs drastically from the practices
exercised by Moon Moo’s operators. Far from cleaning up spilled
manure that might be exposed to precipitation, Moon Moo
sprayed large amounts of manure onto its fields during a
significant rain event in which two inches of rain fell in just two
days. A6. Dr. Ella Mae indicated that the application of manure
during any rain event is an extremely poor management practice,
and that it will nearly always result in nutrient loss. In addition,
Dr. Mae tested the fertilizer used by Moon Moo—a combination of
liquid manure from the farm’s cows and acid whey from the
Chokos plant—and found that the mixture had a pH of 6.1,
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making it a weak acid. Dr. Mae stated that the acidity of the
liquid prevented the Bermuda grass crop from effectively taking
up the nutrients in the mixture. Dr. Emmet Green, Moon Moo’s
expert, did not dispute that the acid whey reduced the soil pH
and reduced nitrogen uptake by the grass. A6. Moon Moo’s choice
to fertilize soil already saturated with rainwater and spray a
solution that would severely limit the crop’s ability to take up its
nutrients does not constitute “reasonable care.” Compare A6
(describing Moon Moo’s practices), with Alt, 979 F. Supp. 2d at
705 (describing significant efforts to contain even small amounts
of pollutants).
It is also important to note that the pollutant discharge in
the instant case was not caused by water precipitation causing
fertilizer runoff, the test Southview Farm sets out for identifying
agricultural stormwater discharges. 34 F.3d at 120-121 (“[A]ll
discharges eventually mix with precipitation run-off in ditches or
streams or navigable waters so the fact that the discharge might
have been mixed with run-off cannot be determinative.”) The
Southview court instead looks to whether the discharge is a
“result of the precipitation.” Id. at 121. As in Southview, Moon
Moo’s discharges “were not the result of rain, but rather simply
occurred on days when it rained.” Id. at 121. The liquid manure
was capable of flowing into the water on its own, and the
significant rain event that occurred over a two-day period only
ensured that the soils were saturated and less likely to absorb the
manure solution. See id. (crediting testimony that “after a rain[ ]
and manure had been applied on the field, [the manure] was
literally running off everywhere up and down those field[s]”).
3.

As a CAFO that Discharges Pollutants into a
Navigable Water, Moon Moo is Subject to
NPDES Permitting Requirements

EPA regulations require CAFOs including Moon Moo to
apply for a NPDES permit:
The discharge of manure, litter or process wastewater to waters
of the United States from a CAFO as a result of the application of
that manure, litter or process wastewater by the CAFO to land
areas under its control is a discharge from that CAFO subject to
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NPDES permit requirements, except where it is an agricultural
storm water discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. [§] 1362(14).

40 C.F.R. §122.23(e); see also Nat’l Pork Producers Council v.
EPA, 635 F.3d 738, 749-51 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that there is
no duty to apply for a NPDES permit for possible discharges, but
such a duty exists for CAFOs that actually discharge);
Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. EPA, 399 F.3d 486, 504-06 (2d Cir.
2005). The EPA regulations state that a CAFO is subject to
NPDES permitting if its land application of manure discharges
“to waters of the United States” unless “it is an agricultural storm
water discharge as provided in 33 U.S.C. 1362(14).” 40 C.F.R.
§122.23(e). This rule further states that a precipitation-related
discharge of manure from land areas under the control of a CAFO
is considered an agricultural stormwater discharge only when
manure has been applied in accordance with site-specific nutrient
management practices and the practices “ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the manure, litter or
process wastewater, as specified in §122.42(e)(1)(vi)-(ix).” 40
C.F.R. §122.23(e); see also Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 496, 507
(defining “point source” as “generally authorizing the regulation
of CAFO discharges, but exempting such discharges from
regulation to the extent that they constitute agricultural
stormwater”).
First, the events that occurred at Moon Moo cannot be
considered agricultural stormwater discharge because of the way
that courts have interpreted this phrase. Relying on a strong body
of appellate case law, in a case consolidated from petitions filed in
several different circuits, the National Pork Producers court
stated that such discharges occur “when rainwater comes in
contact with manure and flows into navigable waters.” Nat’l Pork
Producers, 635 F.3d at 743 (citing Fishermen Against Destruction
of Env’t, Inc. v. Closter Farms, Inc., 300 F.3d 1294, 1297 (11th
Cir. 2002); Southview Farm, 34 F.3d at 121). However, rainwater
contacting manure is not the issue in the instant case. Here, the
farm operators sprayed the liquid fertilizer onto alreadysaturated fields, causing the fertilizer to flow through the
drainage ditch and into a river. A6.
Second, the regulation requires that NMPs “[e]stablish
protocols to land apply manure, litter or process wastewater in
accordance with site specific nutrient management practices that
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ensure appropriate agricultural utilization of the nutrients in the
manure,
litter
or
process
wastewater.”
40
C.F.R.
§122.42(e)(1)(viii). Moon Moo explicitly failed to implement sitespecific practices to ensure that the crops on its land were able to
absorb and utilize the nutrients in the soil amendment. Moon
Moo added liquid whey to its manure before applying the mixture
to the farm’s fields, which both Dr. Mae and Dr. Green indicated
would limit the ability of the Bermuda grass to uptake nutrients
from the liquid fertilizer sprayed on the fields. See A6. In
addition, the farm applied the liquid waste mixture to the land
during a period of heavy rain. As Dr. Mae indicated, this is a very
poor nutrient management practice. A6.11
Even if it is true that Moon Moo’s NMP did not prevent it
from spraying manure on its fields during a rain event, A6-7, the
test set forward in Waterkeeper does not simply seek a
determination of whether the CAFO adhered to its NMP. Instead,
the rule specifies that the practices farm operators engage in
must be site-specific and designed to ensure appropriate
agricultural utilization of the nutrients applied to the site.
Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d at 509.
Updates to the CAFO regulations in light of recent cases do
not alleviate Moon Moo’s duty to apply for a NPDES permit as a
CAFO. In National Pork Producers, the Fifth Circuit upheld the
“duty to apply” for a NPDES permit imposed on CAFOs that are
discharging. 635 F.3d at 756. The updates to the regulation
following National Pork Producers eliminated the obligation of
CAFOs to “propose to discharge.” Compare 40 C.F.R. 122.23(d)
(2011), with 40 C.F.R. 122.23(d) (2012). The new regulation also
removed the option for CAFOs to become “no discharge” CAFOs
by certifying that they will “not be in violation of the requirement
that CAFOs that propose to discharge seek permit coverage.” 40
C.F.R. 122.23(i) (2011) (repealed 2012); see 77 Fed. Reg. 44,497
(Jul. 30, 2012). These adjustments challenge Moon Moo’s status
as a “no discharge” operation, A5, but do not remove its duty to

11. Additionally, the New Union Department of Agriculture does not
generally review NMPs. A5. However, the Second Circuit found in Waterkeeper
that “by failing to provide for EPA review of the NMPs, the 2003 Rule violated
the statutory commandments that the permitting agency must assure
compliance with applicable effluent or discharge limitations.” Nat’l Pork
Producers, 635 F.3d at 745 (summarizing Waterkeeper, 399 F.3d 486).
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apply for a NPDES permit in light of the evidence of discharge
collected by James.
B.

If Moon Moo is not a CAFO, it is Exempt from
NPDES Permitting Because it Complied with its
NMP and was Deemed Not to be a Point Source

Because Moon Moo meets all the other criteria for a CAFO,
the only way this Court could find Moon Moo is not a CAFO is if
it finds that Moon Moo did not discharge pollutants through a
man-made drainage ditch. As described in the previous section,
Moon Moo Farm very easily meets most of the regulatory
requirements for qualification as a CAFO because the cows are
confined for many more than 45 days out of the year and the
grass grown on Moon Moo’s property does not interfere with its
classification as a CAFO. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b). The only element
of the determination of whether the Moon Moo is a CAFO that
can be disputed is whether pollutants from the farm are
discharged into waters of the United States through a man-made
ditch. 40 C.F.R. §122.23(b)(6)(ii)(A). It is clear that discharge from
the farm flows into waters of the United States. As a result, the
dispute over whether Moon Moo Farm is a CAFO hinges on
whether the man-made ditch on the farm’s land facilitates the
discharge of pollutants. This exact same inquiry would need to be
made in a determination of whether Moon Moo Farm was a point
source outside of the CAFO context.
This Court would only reach the conclusion that Moon Moo is
not a CAFO if it rejected the Government’s arguments that the
inadequacy of the Farm’s NMP precludes the permit from
shielding the farm operators from liability for their discharges.
This determination would very likely preclude the Court from
finding that the farm is a point source of any kind, since a point
source is defined by the CWA as “any discernible, confined and
discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any . . . ditch.”
33 U.S.C. §1362(14). In the absence of confidence that the ditch
served as a conveyance, the farm would not be considered a point
source, and would, instead be a nonpoint source. See Or. Natural
Desert Ass’n v. Dombeck, 172 F.3d 1092, 1095 (9th Cir. 1998) (The
CWA defines point sources and clarifies that “[o]ther pollution
sources, such as runoff from agriculture . . . are nonpoint
sources.”). In fact, it is likely that without a drainage ditch
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collecting and concentrating liquid manure, and perhaps due to a
misreading of the details of the instant case, the court would find
that the discharge from Moon Moo constitutes agricultural runoff.
Courts have a longstanding history of considering agricultural
runoff nonpoint source pollution. See, e.g., Natural Res. Def.
Council, Inc. v. Muszynski, 268 F.3d 91, 94 (2d Cir. 2001); Frank
P. Grad, Treatise on Environmental Law §3.03 (2009) (“Nonpoint
sources include pollution from diffuse land use activities such as
agriculture. . .”). If Moon Moo is a nonpoint source, it is not
subject to NPDES permitting requirements because agricultural
runoff is not subject to NPDES permitting. 33 U.S.C. §1342(f)
(indicating that the EPA Administrator can only promulgate
regulations to restrict point sources).
In sum, this Court should find that Moon Moo is a CAFO
subject to NPDES permitting, or, alternatively, that it is not a
CAFO and does not have an obligation to apply for a NPDES
permit. Because there is no dispute regarding the facts necessary
for this inquiry, summary judgment in favor of Appellants is
appropriate.
IV. UNDER RCRA, MOON MOO’S ACTIVITIES
PRESENT AN ENDANGERMENT BUT THEY DO
NOT CONSTITUTE ILLEGAL OPEN DUMPING
Riverwatcher makes two claims in the alternative against
Moon Moo pursuant to the citizen suit provisions of RCRA, a
“comprehensive environmental statute that governs the
treatment, storage, and disposal of solid and hazardous waste,”
Meghrig v. KFC W., 516 U.S. 479, 483 (1996).12 First,
Riverwatcher contends that Moon Moo’s manure-spreading
operations “present an imminent and substantial endangerment
to health or the environment.” See 42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B).
Second, Riverwatcher alleges that Moon Moo’s manure-spreading
operations violate RCRA’s open dumping ban. See 42 U.S.C.
12. RCRA’s “anti-duplication” provision proscribes application of RCRA to the
same activities and substances regulated by other environmental statutes,
including, as is the case here, the CWA. 42 U.S.C. § 6905(a); see e.g., Coon ex rel.
Coon v. Willet Dairy, LP, 536 F.3d 171, 174 (2d Cir. 2008) (RCRA did not apply
to activities of a dairy farm for which it had CWA permit); Greenpeace, Inc. v.
Waste Techs. Indus., 9 F.3d 1174, 1178 (6th Cir.1993) (dismissing endangerment
claim against operator operating within limits of valid RCRA permit).
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§6972(a)(1)(A) (authorizing citizen enforcement of violations of
the open dumping ban).
The first step in reviewing a RCRA claim is to confirm that a
solid waste is involved. “EPA distinguishes between RCRA’s
regulatory and remedial purposes and offers a different definition
of solid waste depending upon the statutory context in which the
term appears.” Conn. Coastal Fishermen’s Ass’n v. Remington
Arms Co., 989 F.2d 1305, 1314 (2d Cir. 1993). Notably, “a
different definition applies to permitting violation claims than to
claims of ‘imminent and substantial endangerment.’” Cordiano v.
Metacon Gun Club, Inc., 575 F.3d 199, 205 (2d Cir. 2009).
The statute broadly defines solid waste as “any garbage,
refuse, sludge from a waste treatment plant, water supply
treatment plant, or air pollution control facility and other
discarded material, including solid, liquid, semisolid, or contained
gaseous material . . . .” 42 U.S.C. §6903(27) (emphasis added).
While the statute does not define “discarded,” courts have defined
the term according to the dictionary and common usage as “‘cast
aside; reject; abandon; give up,’” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer,
373 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing 1 The New Shorter
Oxford English Dictionary 684 (4th ed.1993)), and have further
explained that “material is not discarded until after it has served
its intended purpose.” No Spray Coal., Inc. v. New York, 252 F.3d
148, 150 (2d Cir. 2001). Accordingly, once a product is
“indisputably discarded” it has become part of the waste disposal
stream and may be regulated under RCRA. Am. Petroleum Inst.
v. EPA, 906 F.2d 729, 741 (D.C. Cir.1990); see also Conn. Coastal,
989 F.2d at 1314-15 (determining, “[w]ithout deciding how long
materials must accumulate before they become discarded,” that
shot and targets released into the environment, and left long
after serving their intended purpose, had been “discarded”). For
example, pesticides sprayed in order to reach and kill mosquitoes
were not discarded because “material is not discarded until after
it has served its intended purpose.” No Spray Coal., 252 F.3d at
150.13 Additionally, “the fact that discarded materials are ‘solid
13. This doctrine is distorted by the Ninth Circuit’s pronouncement that
materials are not discarded if “dispersal to the environment is an expected
consequence of [their] use.” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec., 713
F.3d 502, 515-16 (9th Cir. 2013). Without defining “expected consequences,” the
Ninth Circuit’s holding has the potential to exclude from the definition of
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waste’ under RCRA does not change ‘just because a reclaimer has
purchased or finds value in the components.’” Safe Air, 373 F.3d
at 1043 n.8 (citing United States v. ILCO, 996 F.2d 1126, 1131
(11th Cir. 1993)).
The regulatory definition at 40 C.F.R.§261.2 narrows the
definition of “solid waste” by explaining that “discarded material”
is “abandoned”, “recycled”, “inherently waste-like” or a “military
munition” as those terms are further defined in RCRA Subtitle C,
which governs the treatment, transportation, storage and
disposal of regulated hazardous waste. The regulations also
exempt a number of materials from qualification as, and
therefore disposal requirements of, solid waste. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 257.1(c)(1) (excluding from the open dumping criteria
“agricultural wastes, including manures and crop residues,
returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners”). A
regulated solid waste is always a solid waste under the statute
but the reverse is not always true.
The district court mistakenly applied the same statutory
definition of “solid waste” in its rejection of both the
endangerment and open dumping claims. Accordingly, the district
court erred in dismissing Riverwatcher’s endangerment claim.
However, Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping ban,
which the district court correctly dismissed.
A. The District Court’s Singular Reliance on the
Regulatory Definition of “Solid Waste” Defies
Congressional Intent to Protect Health and the
Environment
RCRA’s primary and overriding objective is “to promote the
protection of health and the environment 42 U.S.C. § 6902. To
that end, Congress authorized both citizens and the Government
to bring suit “against any person . . . who has contributed or who
is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
“discarded” any materials for which spills, leaks, and oversaturation could be
construed as “expected consequences” of use. Such a gross expansion of the
Second Circuit’s holding in No Spray Coal., 252 F.3d at 150, upon which the
Ninth Circuit purports to rely, will likely encourage and indemnify use of
countless high-risk products simply because the risks they pose may be
expected. Surely this was not Congress’s intent.
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waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.” 42 U.S.C.
§6972(a)(1)(B) (authorizing citizen suits); id §6973. (authorizing
such suits by the EPA Administrator). “[T]he statute itself still
provides the relevant definition for purposes of Subtitle G, which
authorizes the Administrator—or, indeed, ‘any person’—to bring
suit in order to force such action as may be necessary to abate ‘an
imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the
environment’ caused by solid waste.” Military Toxics Project v.
EPA, 146 F.3d 948, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (internal citations
omitted).
1.

Congress Intended the Endangerment
Standard to Be Broad

To provide the most protection for public health and the
environment, the standard for RCRA endangerment claims
permits “any person” to bring suit against:
any person, including the United States and any other
governmental instrumentality or agency . . . who has contributed
or who is contributing to the past or present handling, storage,
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid or hazardous
waste which may present an imminent and substantial
endangerment to health or the environment.

42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B) (emphasis added). Courts have
interpreted this endangerment standard broadly. First,
endangerment requires “threatened or potential harm and does
not require proof of actual harm.” Davis v. Sun Oil Co., 148 F.3d
606, 610 (6th Cir. 1998); see also Price v. U.S. Navy, 39 F.3d 1011,
1019 (9th Cir. 1994). An emergency is not required. See, e.g.,
Maine People’s Alliance v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 471 F.3d 277, 296
(1st Cir. 2006). Second, “imminence” “implies that there must be
a threat which is present now, although the impact of the threat
may not be felt until later.” Meghrig, 516 U.S. at 486. Third, an
endangerment is “substantial” if there is “some reasonable cause
for concern that someone or something may be exposed to a risk
of harm by a release or a threatened release of a hazardous
substance if remedial action is not taken.” Interfaith Cmty. Org.
v. Honeywell Int’l, Inc., 399 F.3d 248, 259 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). Quantification of the
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endangerment, such as proof that a certain number of persons
will be exposed or that a water supply will be contaminated to a
specific degree, is not required. Id. And, fourth, endangerment
claims are not contingent on other violations of law. See, e.g., Cox
v. City of Dallas, 256 F.3d 281, 291-92 (5th Cir. 2001) (the
endangerment provisions are “essentially a codification of
common law nuisance remedies”).14 For the foregoing reasons, the
standards for establishing endangerment are generous in order to
most comprehensively protect human health and the
environment.
2.

Riverwatcher’s Endangerment Claim Was
Improperly Dismissed

Dismissal was improper because the district court applied
the wrong standard and Riverwatcher has established an
endangerment under the proper standard. As a threshold matter,
the district court erred by using in its endangerment analysis the
regulatory definition of “solid waste,” which applies only to the
open dumping claim. The statutory definition includes the term
“discarded material,” 42 U.S.C. §6903(27), but it does not contain
the concepts “abandoned” or “disposed of” required by the
regulatory definition, 40 C.F.R. §§261.2(a)(2), (b)(1); Conn.
Coastal, 989 F.2d at 1316. The soil amendment is discarded
because there is no evidence that the acid whey from Chokos
beneficially conditions or fertilizes the soil, and the fact that
Moon Moo has received it for free, A5, suggests that it has no
market value and should be considered part of the waste stream.
See Safe Food & Fertilizer v. EPA, 350 F.3d 1263, 1268 (D.C. Cir.
2003), reh’g on other grounds, 365 F.3d 46 (D.C. Cir. 2004)
(stating that RCRA’s statutory definition covers materials
beneficially reused in another industrial process “if they can
reasonably be considered part of the waste disposal problem”). By
simply incorporating the regulatory analysis, the district court
overlooked the fact that both the acid whey, which Moon Moo has
“accepted (without paying for)” from the Chokos plant, A5, and

14. In fact, endangerment claims are often precluded by violations of law. For
example, endangerment claims do not apply to permit violations under the
CWA. Supra note 12.
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the manure are discarded within the ordinary meaning required
by the statute.
Next, Moon Moo “is contributing to or has contributed to” the
handling of this waste. Moon Moo has contributed to the
endangerment by mixing acid whey and manure and spreading
this substance on its fields. See A5. The district court improperly
considered the fact that Moon Moo’s operation may not have been
the “but for” cause of the elevated nitrate levels. A11.
Endangerment claims require that a defendant “contribute to”—
not be the “but for cause” of—the endangerment. E.g., Cox, 256
F.3d at 295 (defining “contribute to” to mean “have a part or
share in producing an effect”). Additionally, Moon Moo is not
absolved by the contention that “land application of whey as a soil
conditioner was a longstanding practice . . . in New Union since
the 1940s,” A6, because RCRA’s endangerment provisions extend
to “any person . . . who has contributed or who is contributing to,”
42 U.S.C. §6972(a)(1)(B), “regardless of fault or negligence,” H.R.
Rep. No. 98-1133, at 119 (1984) (Conf. Rep.).
Finally, Moon Moo’s spreading activities have contributed to
the elevated nitrate levels, as illustrated by the April 2013
advisory, and constitute an endangerment. The district court
fundamentally misunderstood the purpose of RCRA when it ruled
that despite health risks to children, no endangerment exists
because “it appears that nitrates pose no health risks to adults
and juveniles, and that households with infants administer
bottled water to their infants, avoiding any potential health risk.”
A11-12.15 For this proposition, the court below relies on a nonbinding lower court decision, which disregarded the
Congressional intent of RCRA. In Davies v. Nat’l Co-op. Refinery
Ass’n, 963 F. Supp. 990, 999 (D. Kan. 1997), the district court’s
solution to what it conceded to be serious pollution of drinking
water was that “the threat of exposure can always be avoided by
evacuating property where hazardous waste is found or by taking
other extraordinary measures.” Davies, 963 F. Supp. at 999. The

15. Government studies confirm that nitrates ingested through drinking
water can impair oxygen delivery to tissues and result in adverse effects
including coma and death. While infants under 3 months are at highest risk,
ingestion of nitrates poses risks to older children and adults at higher levels. See
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Nitrates and Nitrites: TEACH Chemical Summary 1
(2007).
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Davies court further stated that requiring the Plaintiffs to use
bottled rather than groundwater is “an inconvenience and an
economic burden,” but is still appropriately settled in an action at
law. Id. This explanation is in direct conflict with the legislative
intent of prevention and protection, as noted in RCRA and other
environmental legislation. See, e.g., Furrer v. Brown, 62 F.3d
1092, 1098 (8th Cir. 1995) (“RCRA’s goal is to prevent the creation
of hazardous waste sites.”) (emphasis added).
Because Riverwatcher has established as a matter of law
that Moon Moo’s spreading activities may present an
endangerment to health or the environment, the Court should
grant summary judgment in its favor. If, however, the Court
determines that the record is inadequate to apply the factsensitive endangerment standard, the Court should remand the
endangerment claim for additional fact-finding.16
B. Moon Moo Farm’s Spreading Activities Do Not
Constitute Illegal Open Dumping
Moon Moo’s manure-spreading activities do not constitute
open dumping under RCRA because the soil amendment is
serving its intended purpose and therefore not “discarded” within
the definition of RCRA and, even if it were, agricultural wastes
returned to the soil as fertilizer or conditioner are exempt from
the open dumping ban. RCRA specifically proscribes “open
dumping of solid waste.” 42 U.S.C. §6945(a). To prevent overregulation and conserve government resources, EPA has
delineated materials and activities that are not of regulatory
16. For cases highlighting the fact-sensitive nature of similar endangerment
claims, see Citizens George & Margaret, LLC, 954 F. Supp. 2d 1151, 1160 (E.D.
Wash. 2013) (dismissal of endangerment claim against dairies for alleged
contamination of drinking water would be premature “without any argument or
evidence as to whether the manure was put to its intended use and/or used for
beneficial purposes by Defendants under the circumstances unique to this
case”); Waterkeeper Alliance, Inc. v. Smithfield Foods, Inc., No. 4:01-CV-27–H(3),
2001 WL 1715730, at *4 (E.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2001) (“[W]hether defendants
return animal waste to the soil for fertilization purposes or instead apply waste
in such large quantities that its usefulness as organic fertilizer is eliminated is a
question of fact.”). See also Oklahoma v. Tyson Foods, Inc., No. 05-CV-0329GKF-PJC, 2010 WL 653032 at *11-12 (N.D. Okla. Feb 17, 2010) (determining,
after extensive inquiry into the material’s market value and a finding on the
benefit of its soil application, that poultry litter applied to the soil did not
constitute “solid waste”).
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concern, and are therefore exempt from the open dumping ban.
See 40 C.F.R. §257.1(c).
Courts have distinguished between “recycling” and
“discarding”: materials destined for immediate reuse as part of an
ongoing production process are not subject to RCRA because they
are not discarded. Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 824 F.2d 1177, 1193
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (“Congress clearly and unambiguously expressed
its intent that ‘solid waste’ (and therefore EPA’s regulatory
authority) be limited to materials that are ‘discarded’ by virtue of
being disposed of, abandoned, or thrown away.”).
Congress has explicitly exempted from the open dumping ban
“agricultural wastes, including manures and crop residues,
returned to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners.” 40 C.F.R.
§257.1(c)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 246.101(a) (defining agricultural
solid waste as “solid waste that is generated by the rearing of
animals, and the producing and harvesting of crops or trees”).
Animal waste, per se, is not automatically exempt. Rather, such
agricultural waste, including manure, is exempt if it is “returned
to the soil as fertilizers or soil conditioners.” Id. §257.1(c)(1)
(emphasis added).
The district court properly recognized that Moon Moo’s soil
amendment is likely not a “solid waste” under the regulatory
framework. A11. The liquid manure is in-process secondary
material outside the reach of RCRA because it is beneficially
reused within the yogurt production process, which includes both
the dairy and the activities at the Chokos plant. See, e.g., Am.
Mining Cong., 824 F.2d at 1193 (in-process secondary materials
are not within RCRA).
Moreover, even if the Court were to find that the soil
amendment is properly considered “solid waste” for regulatory
purposes, the open dumping claim necessarily fails because
agricultural waste returned to the soil as conditioner or fertilizer
is specifically exempt from the open dumping ban. A5; 40 C.F.R.
§257.1(c)(1); see, e.g., Safe Air, 373 F.3d at 1041 (RCRA’s solid
waste regulations do not cover grass residue burned as soil
amendment). Riverwatcher did not challenge the utility of
applying manure and whey as soil conditioner. Without a factual
dispute, this Court should assume, as the district court did, that
the soil amendment is conditioning the soil and is therefore
exempt from the open dumping ban.
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The district court correctly dismissed Riverwatcher’s open
dumping claims. A decision to the contrary would require EPA to
overregulate substances and activities it has determined
generally do not present a hazard to human health or the
environment and would proscribe beneficial reuse of materials.
To the extent that activities exempt from both permitting and the
open dumping ban threaten human health and the environment,
the imminent and substantial endangerment mechanism
provides the Government and citizens alike a sufficient backstop.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Government respectfully asks
the Court to reverse the district court’s determinations on the
following points and instead find that: (1) Queechunk is a publicly
navigable waterway; (2) even if it were not, evidence obtained by
a private party (even through trespass) is admissible in a civil
enforcement proceeding under the CWA; (3) Moon Moo is a CAFO
whose discharge from its manure land application area subjects it
to NPDES permitting; and (4) Moon Moo’s spreading activities
present an imminent and substantial endangerment. The
Government further petitions the Court to affirm the district
court’s rulings that (1) if Moon Moo is not a CAFO, application of
manure in compliance with an NMP exempts it from NPDES
permitting requirements as agricultural stormwater and (2)
Moon Moo has not violated the open dumping provisions of
RCRA.
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